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Abstract 
Bureaucratic behavior in developing countries remains poorly understood. Why do some 
public servants – yet not others – work hard to deliver public services, misuse state 
resources, and/or participate in electoral mobilization? A classic answer comes from Weber: 
bureaucratic structures shift behavior towards integrity, neutrality, and commitment to 
public service. Our paper conducts the first survey experimental test of the effects of 
bureaucratic structures. It does so through a conjoint experiment with public servants in the 
Dominican Republic. Looking at merit examinations and job stability, we find that Weber 
was right – but only partially. Recruitment by examination curbs corruption and political 
services by bureaucrats, while enhancing work motivation. Job stability, by contrast, only 
decreases political services: tenured bureaucrats are less likely to participate in electoral 
mobilization. Examinations thus enhance the quality of bureaucracy (motivation and lower 
corruption) and democracy (electoral competition); job stability only enhances the quality 
of democracy. 
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1. Introduction 
What public servants do plays central and manifold – yet underappreciated – roles in 
development. To cite just three examples: how hard public servants work shapes the 
quantity and quality of public services citizens receive (see, e.g., Tendler, 1997; UNDP, 2014). 
Whether or not public servants engage in corrupt behavior alters the amount of state 
resources available for public service delivery, as well as the trust citizens place in 
government (see, e.g., Morris & Klesner, 2010; S. Rose-Ackerman, 1999). And whether or not 
public servants turn out to campaign for governing parties shapes electoral playing fields – 
and thus the fairness of elections (see, e.g., Folke, Hirano, & Snyder, 2011; Larreguy, Olea, & 
Querubin, 2014). Bureaucratic behavior thus concurrently affects the quality of public 
services, the quality of democratic competition, and the extent of corruption. Yet, we know 
surprisingly little about the determinants of bureaucratic behavior in the developing world. 
Why do some public servants take part in electoral mobilization, yet others do not? Why do 
some work hard on the job, while others do not? And why do some misuse public resources, 
yet others do not?  
A classic answer comes from Max Weber. Weber (1978) posited that bureaucratic 
structures shape bureaucratic behavior. Where public servants are recruited through merit 
examinations, with lifelong job stability protections (tenure) and predictable promotions, 
and pay progression, they develop an esprit de corps around commitment to public service, 
political neutrality, and integrity. Competing theoretical perspectives on bureaucratic 
structures do exist, however. New Public Management (NPM)-inspired prescriptions, for 
instance, argued for fewer job stability protections and more flexible salary setting 
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(Manning, 2001).3 The policy repercussions of this debate are important. The World Bank, 
for instance, loans US$422m per year for civil service reforms, funding 277 projects between 
1990 and 2013 (Blum, 2014; World Bank, 2008). Arguably, such reforms should be based on 
evidence about how these reforms influence the behavior of those they primarily seek to 
affect: public servants. 
Yet, robust empirical evidence for the effects of bureaucratic structures on bureaucratic 
behavior in the developing world is largely lacking. A handful of cross-country and -state 
regressions have correlated Weberian bureaucratic structures with economic growth (Evans 
& Rauch, 1999), poverty reduction (Henderson, Hulme, Jalilian, & Phillips, 2007), lower 
corruption (Dahlström, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012a; Neshkova & Kostadinova, 2012; Rauch 
& Evans, 2000), greater infrastructure investment (Rauch, 1995), better regulation 
(Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016), and improved health outcomes (Cingolani, Thomsson, & de 
Crombrugghe, 2015). At the level of individual public servants in turn, bureaucratic 
structures correlate with lower corruption and clientelism (Meyer-Sahling & Mikkelsen, 
2016; Oliveros, 2016b).  
How much we can learn from these studies is unclear, however. Cross-country 
regressions – which neglect the large inter-institutional variation of bureaucratic structures 
within countries – are likely to be biased (Gingerich, 2013a). Moreover, both cross-country 
and cross-public servant studies suffer, as observational studies, from omitted variable and 
reverse causality biases. Merit examinations, for instance, are likely to affect and be affected 
by corruption. Existing studies also mostly focus on one dependent variable at a time. 
                                                        
3  As a caveat, note that most scholars challenge the utility of NPM prescriptions in developing countries 
(Manning, 2001). 
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Arguably, however, the desirability of bureaucratic structures depends on their concurrent 
effects on the political and administrative behavior of public servants. 
To address these shortcomings, this paper conducts the, to our knowledge, first survey 
experimental test of the effects of bureaucratic structures. We focus on two key aspects of 
Weberian states (merit examinations and tenure protections) and assess their effects on 
three central dimensions of bureaucratic behavior and attitudes in developing countries: 
corruption, clientelism, and work motivation.  
Our experimental design – a conjoint survey experiment – is the first application of this 
method to the study of bureaucracy; it thus also responds to the manifold recent calls to 
expand and innovate on the experimental study of bureaucracy (e.g. James, Jilke, & Van 
Ryzin, 2017). We conducted this survey experiment with a population which remains 
understudied by scholars: government employees in highly politicized states, in our case 558 
career public servants in the Dominican Republic. We find that merit examinations affect all 
three studied dimensions of bureaucratic behavior favorably: they are associated with fewer 
political services (clientelism), lower corruption, and greater work motivation of public 
employees. Substantively, the effects on political services and corruption are largest, with a 
less strong effect on work motivation. The primary benefit of examinations in politicized 
states thus appears to be not a more hard-working civil service, but a less clientelistic and 
corrupt one, with fewer public employees campaigning for parties or misusing state 
resources. The effect of bureaucratic job stability, by contrast, is limited to curbing political 
services: public servants protected from dismissal are less likely to participate in electoral 
mobilization. By contrast, job stability is not robustly associated with work motivation and 
corruption.  
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Our findings thus confirm most – albeit not all – of Weber’s predictions. Merit 
examinations, indeed, contributes to a public service which works with greater integrity, 
motivation, and political neutrality. Job stability protections, by contrast, only deliver on one 
of Weber’s promises: a more politically neutral public service, which is less willing to help 
with electoral efforts. Somewhat ironically, introducing tenure thus appears to be principally 
a means to improve the quality of electoral competition, not bureaucratic work motivation 
or integrity. For the manifold civil service reform attempts in developing countries, this is 
welcome news: changing bureaucratic structures can shift bureaucratic behavior in 
developing states for the better. Governance practitioners should thus take Weber to heart. 
 
2. Merit Examinations, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior  
A growing number of scholarly works sheds light on bureaucracies in developing countries 
(see, among many, Fukuyama, 2014; Grindle, 2012; Rothstein, 2011). For our purposes, this 
body of research has usefully illustrated the diversity of bureaucratic structures. In 
particular, countries and state institutions within them vary in regards to whether they 
recruit their public employees through merit examinations (merit) or discretionary 
appointments; and whether they provide them with job stability protections (tenure) or 
maintain discretion over dismissals (Gingerich, 2013b; Rauch & Evans, 2000).4 Yet, how 
variation in merit and tenure affects the behavior of public servants in developing countries 
remains scantly studied.  
                                                        
4 Note that merit and tenure need not – and frequently do not – coincide in developing countries (Dahlström, 
Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012b; Schuster, 2016a). 
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In regards to our first dimension of bureaucratic behavior – corruption5 – most of the 
extant literature is of little avail: it focuses on incentive structures and behavior of political 
elites.6 The relationship between corruption and our bureaucratic structures of interest, 
however, has received a lot less attention in the literature.  
Recruitment through examinations rather than by discretionary appointment has been 
associated with lower corruption in at least four studies (Charron, Dahlström, Fazekas, & 
Lapuente, 2017; Dahlström et al., 2012a; Meyer-Sahling & Mikkelsen, 2016; Rauch & Evans, 
2000). Drawing on cross-country expert-survey data, Rauch and Evans (2000) and 
Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2012a) find that the level of meritocratic recruitment 
correlates with lower corruption. Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen (2016) identify the same 
effect in surveys of public employees in post-communist countries, as do Charron et al. 
(2017) for corruption risks in public procurement in European regions, albeit with a 
measure that approximates merit promotions rather than recruitment. Theoretically, this 
relationship is plausible, even if evidence on the (competing) underlying mechanisms is 
missing to-date. Public servants recruited through examinations may be more likely to 
develop an esprit de corps, a professional bureaucracy with “greater adherence to norms of 
behavior” of integrity (Rauch & Evans, 2000, p. 52). Alternatively, merit recruitment may 
curb corruption by creating a “separation of interests:” a professional bureaucracy—in 
which employees are recruited based on merit and not political criteria— will have different 
interests from politicians, which facilitates checks and balances (Dahlström et al., 2012a). 
                                                        
5 In this paper we define corruption as the abuse of public office or state resources for personal or political gain 
(see, among many, Gingerich, 2013b, p. 10 for a similar definition). 
6 Scholars have sought to explain varying levels of corruption by looking at electoral systems (e.g. Gingerich, 
2013b), information (e.g. Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013), and electoral competition (e.g. Grzymala-Busse, 
2007), to mention a few examples (see Treisman, 2007 for a review of this literature).  
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Based on the existing evidence and the mechanisms outlined, we expect to find a positive 
effect of meritocracy on curbing corruption. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Public employees recruited through examinations will be less likely to 
engage in corrupt behavior. 
Empirically and theoretically, the relationship between bureaucratic job stability and 
corruption is less clear-cut. Neither Rauch and Evans (2000) nor Dahlström et al. (2012a) 
find significant correlations in their studies. Theoretically, however, we could expect tenure 
to affect corruption. If the esprit de corps hypothesis held, tenure should facilitate long-term 
socialization into a public service ethos which should curb corruption (Dahlström et al., 
2012a). Moreover, long time horizons guaranteed by the tenure system should reduce the 
relative attractiveness of quick returns from corruption (see, classically, Becker & Stigler, 
1974). Finally, a tenure system should also help protect (honest) bureaucrats from corrupt 
politicians pressuring bureaucrats to help them in corrupt enterprises. For these reasons, 
we expect to find a positive effect of tenure on curbing corruption. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Public employees with job stability protections will be less likely to 
engage in corrupt behavior. 
Alternatively, however, the tenure system could also help protect corrupt bureaucrats 
from (honest) politicians. To fire a corrupt employee whose tenure is protected, an illegal 
act needs to be proven. Since acts of corruption are particularly hard to prove, the tenure 
system could also shelter potentially corrupt employees. We propose then an alternative 
hypothesis to H2. 
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Hypothesis 2’ (H2’): Public employees with job stability protections will be more likely to 
engage in corrupt behavior. 
The effects of merit and tenure on our second dimension of bureaucratic behavior – 
clientelism – has been even more rarely studied. The literature on clientelism in public 
employment is, of course, vast (see, e.g., Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Grzymala-Busse, 2007; 
O'Dwyer, 2006). Yet, to our knowledge, no prior study has directly assessed the effect of 
merit examinations on clientelism; and only one study correlates tenure with relatively 
(less) political services (Oliveros, 2016b). This omission is remarkable given the centrality 
of bureaucrats in clientelist exchanges, and the centrality of clientelism in the functioning of 
new democracies (Grzymala-Busse, 2007; O'Dwyer, 2006).  
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence for the effects of bureaucratic structures on 
the bureaucrats’ side of patron-client bargains: the provision of political support or services 
to help (governing) parties’ or politicians’ electoral fortunes. Such support often involves 
helping with electoral mobilization, attending rallies or campaign events, monitoring 
elections, and transforming public services and administrative procedures into clientelistic 
exchanges (Oliveros, 2016a, 2016b; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013; Weitz-
Shapiro, 2014; Zarazaga, 2014).7 In clientelist agreements, political patrons may reciprocate 
such services with goods or favors for bureaucrats – including jobs, pay rises, promotions, 
favorable transfers, and protection from dismissal.8 
                                                        
7 In higher-level positions, political support can also equate to ensuring that lower-level employees and state 
resources are fully used to support political patrons (see, e.g., Geddes, 1996; Gingerich, 2013b). 
8 We thus understand clientelism as a personalized and discretionary exchange of goods or favors for political 
support (see, e.g., Stokes et al. (2013, p. 6-18) for a similar definition). 
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We expect both merit examinations and job stability to curb political service 
provision by bureaucrats. Merit examinations preclude discretionary appointments to the 
public sector, and thus deprive political patrons of one important good to trade in exchange 
for political services: jobs.9 Since employees do not owe their positions to a political patron, 
there is no explicit or implicit understanding for the provision of political services in return 
for recruitment into the public sector (see, among many, Geddes, 1996; Oliveros, 2016b).10 
For this reason, we expect that merit examinations will have a negative effect on the 
provision of political services, such as helping with electoral mobilization or attending a 
campaign event. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Public employees recruited through examinations will be less likely to 
provide political services. 
For tenure protections, we expect a similar effect. Prior studies point to two 
underlying mechanisms. First, with job stability, public sector jobs are not anymore a 
“reversible method of redistribution” (Robinson & Verdier, 2013, p. 261): dismissals are not 
anymore a credible threat that politicians can use to make bureaucrats provide political 
support. In this way, tenure provisions protect employees from political pressures to 
participate in electoral mobilization.11 Second, irrespective of this threat of dismissal, non-
tenured employees might be more inclined to provide political services because they might 
                                                        
9 This particular exchange is sometimes termed patronage (see, for instance, Stokes, 2007). Other scholars, 
however, equate patronage with clientelism (e.g. Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007a) and, still others equate it with 
discretionary appointments to public sector positions (e.g. Grindle, 2012). For our purposes, it suffices to note 
that public jobs are a central, albeit not the only, good patrons can offer in exchange of political services.  
10 Public employees may still provide political services in exchange for other goods or promises from patrons, 
such as pay rises or protection from dismissal.  
11 The fear of losing their job (either because of getting fired by the incumbent administration or a new one) is 
not the only fear that public employees hold. Even tenured employees might fear being demoted, transferred, 
or sidestepped, for instance (Oliveros, 2016b).  
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fear losing their jobs with a change in the administration. Indeed, in at least one study, 
untenured employees who more closely identified with the incumbent are more likely to 
provide political services to help the incumbent stay in power because they are afraid of 
losing their jobs with a change of administration (Oliveros, 2016b).12 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Public employees with job stability protections will be less likely to 
provide political services. 
Finally, in regards to our third dimension – work motivation – the empirical literature 
on bureaucratic structures in developing countries is, to our knowledge, largely mute. This 
reflects a more general dearth of studies examining the work motivation of civil servants in 
developing countries (Tendler, 1997).13 First, examinations could, theoretically, be expected 
to both increase and decrease work motivation. Ideally, political appointees would be 
characterized by “responsive competence” (Moe, 1985, p. 244). Owing their positions to 
political patrons, they are responsive to the needs of authorities and thus, arguably, more 
willing to work hard to deliver results for them.  
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Public employees recruited through examinations will be less motivated 
to work. 
                                                        
12 A competing prediction arises if insights from the literature on reciprocal patron-client relations are taken 
at face value. This literature suggests that feelings of reciprocity, rather than self-interest, monitoring or 
punishment, are at the core of clientelistic exchanges (Finan & Schechter, 2012; Lawson & Greene, 2014). From 
this perspective, one would expect that employees with job stability would be more willing to reciprocate their 
tenure contracts with more political services, instead of less. Most studies of clientelism, however, take 
instrumental views, and no prior studies have studied reciprocity effects within bureaucracies to our 
knowledge.  
13 A range of studies has examined public service motivation – “an orientation to delivering services to people 
with a purpose to do good for others and society” – in developing countries (e.g. Houston, 2014; Kim et al., 
2013, p. 80). Yet, to our knowledge, work motivation – the willingness to work hard and work well – has not 
been studied. 
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At the same time, however – and contrary to Moe’s (1985, p. 244) ideal – 
responsiveness may come at the cost of competence. Employees selected through open, 
merit-based competitions with (large) applicant pools are likely to feature greater 
professional competence. As such, they are also more likely to develop professional norms 
which in turn are associated with greater motivation and performance (see, e.g., Andersen, 
2009). Regrettably, empirical evidence which resolves these competing predictions is 
unavailable.14 Our study is the first to fill this lacuna. We therefore propose an alternative 
hypothesis to H5. 
Hypothesis 5’ (H5’): Public employees recruited through examinations will be more 
motivated to work. 
The literature on job stability protections, similarly, offers competing predictions. 
Tenure facilitates socialization into Weber’s (1978) public service ethos, which in turn could 
be expected to enhance work commitment and motivation. Moreover, job security enhances 
employee feelings of safety and thus of working in a supportive working environment – 
which could equally enhance their work motivation. Consistent with these mechanisms, 
tenure has been associated with greater work motivation in civil services in several OECD 
countries as well as in social services – such as for medical personnel – in developing 
countries (Buelens & Van den Broeck, 2007; Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008).  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Public employees with job stability protections will be more motivated 
to work. 
                                                        
14  Political appointees have been associated with lower performance outcomes in the U.S. bureaucracy 
literature (Gallo & Lewis, 2012; Lewis, 2007). This does not remedy the lack of evidence on work motivation, 
however: more responsive (but less competent) appointees could be more motivated to work, yet still achieve 
worse performance outcomes.  
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Tenure protections, however, also deprive managers of an important sanction for 
unmotivated, non-performing employees; and in some sectors – such as academia – tenure 
can correlate with lower productivity (and thus, arguably, work motivation) (see, classically, 
Holley, 1977).  
Hypothesis 6’ (H6’): Public employees with job stability protections will be less motivated 
to work. 
 
3. Research Design 
To isolate the effects of bureaucratic structures, we employ a conjoint survey experiment. In 
the experiment, we ask respondents to choose between pairs of hypothetical colleagues in 
the public sector, randomly varying several of the colleagues’ characteristics. To our 
knowledge, this is the first application of conjoint experiments to study bureaucracy and 
bureaucrats. Conjoints have recently seen uptake in political science, with studies in areas 
such as attitudes towards immigration (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015) and election of 
working class candidates (Carnes & Lupu, 2016). Beyond its empirical contributions, this 
paper also demonstrates that this method can be usefully adapted to the study of 
bureaucracy.  
Conjoint experiments are particularly suited for our purpose: they allow us to identify, 
measure, and compare the independent effects of various characteristics in a single 
experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto, 2014). This is achieved through a choice-
based design in which respondents are asked to choose between hypothetical profiles with 
randomly varying attribute values. In our specific adaptation to the study of bureaucratic 
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behavior, we ask public servants to choose between pairs of hypothetical colleagues in the 
public sector, randomly varying several of the colleagues’ characteristics – including how 
they were recruited and whether they enjoy job stability.  
This technique offers several methodological advantages over regular surveys with 
direct elicitation of responses and over other types of survey experiments. To begin with, 
randomization of attributes addresses concerns with omitted variable and reverse causality 
biases in observational studies. Moreover, conjoint experiments reduce problems of social 
desirability bias in multiple ways. Respondents are provided with multiple reasons to justify 
any particular choice (Hainmueller et al., 2014). Choices also do not require assessments of 
absolute levels of corruption, political services, or work motivation – only relative 
assessments of two choices. Third, contrary to other survey experiment techniques, conjoint 
experiments allow us to estimate the effects of different attributes simultaneously. To 
illustrate, in our application, we can simultaneously assess the independent effects of gender, 
education, form of recruitment, job stability, seniority, and position on the perception of 
respondents on, for instance, how easily these employees could be convinced to attend a 
campaign event. Finally, choices presented in conjoint designs often involve trade-offs 
between preferences for different characteristics, offering greater realism than the direct 
elicitation of preferences on one dimension (Hainmueller et al., 2014). In part as a result, 
conjoints also perform more strongly than other experiments in terms of their external 
validity (Hainmueller, Hangartner, & Yamamoto, 2015).  
Our choice to use a conjoint experiment comes, however, with an important downside: 
our outcome variables are perception-based. Measuring perceptions of bureaucratic 
behavior is, of course, not the same as measuring actual bureaucratic behavior. Yet, a broad 
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literature contends that perception-based measures can be useful to study issues as diverse 
as policy and ideological positions of parties and politicians (e.g., Murillo, Oliveros, & 
Vaishnav, 2010; Wiesehomeier & Benoit, 2009), corruption (e.g. Anderson & Tverdova, 
2003; Davis, Camp, & Coleman, 2004), and clientelism (Kitschelt & Kselman, 2013). Our 
particular perception-based measures of corruption, clientelism, and work motivation 
approximate expert surveys—a useful technique to measure complex or difficult to observe 
variables (Wiesehomeier & Benoit, 2009).15 Our conjoint experiment resembles an expert 
survey approach in the sense that we are asking our respondents to report their perceptions 
on others, in our case colleagues with certain attributes. Relative to other expert surveys, 
however, our respondents interact with colleagues with the characteristics we are studying 
here on a daily basis and are thus much more likely and able to base their responses on first-
hand knowledge of the outcomes. As a result, it is plausible to expect that the way our 
respondents perceive hypothetical colleagues to be more or less inclined towards hard work, 
integrity, and political neutrality to be based on the respondents’ personal experiences with 
colleagues with similar characteristics.16 
 
3.1 Case selection  
Our case selection rationale was three-fold. To get leverage on the effect of bureaucratic 
structures on bureaucratic behavior, we sought a case in which bureaucratic clientelism and 
                                                        
15  Indeed, prior studies do suggest that expert surveys can provide important insights into bureaucratic 
behavior, including patronage and clientelism (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007b; Kopecký, Mair, & Spirova, 2012). 
16  Bureaucratic behavior, of course, need not be studied based on perceptions. Inventive measures of 
bureaucratic behavior are offered in recent works (see, e.g., Charron et al., 2017; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014). These 
original measurement solutions come, however, with an important downside for our purpose: they typically 
measure only one outcome at a time. Our objective, by contrast, was to measure three outcomes of bureaucratic 
structures simultaneously – work motivation, corruption, and clientelism.  
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corruption are sufficiently widespread to be observable by bureaucrats; and in which merit 
and tenure vary within state institutions. To enhance confidence in the generalizability of 
our findings, we, in addition, sought a “less likely” case, which was biased against an effect of 
Weberian bureaucratic structures on bureaucratic behavior. With this rationale, we selected 
the central government in the Dominican Republic (DR). 
Clientelism and corruption are widespread in the DR’s central government. The DR 
ranks as the third most clientelist state in the world according to an expert survey in 88 
countries (Kitschelt, 2014); and the most clientelist country in Latin America 
(AmericasBarometer, 2014). It also ranks high in bureaucratic corruption, scoring 0.81 in 
the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Public Sector Corruption Index – a measure of bribery 
and embezzlement of public funds by public employees (Coppedge et al., 2017). The score 
puts the DR close to the countries with the highest bureaucratic corruption worldwide.17  
In this context, political discretion has historically been the rule of the game in civil 
service management, from recruitment to promotion, pay and dismissal (Schuster, 2016b). 
In fact, according to an expert survey in 179 policy areas in 22 countries (Kopecky et al., 
2016), the DR features the state with the greatest range and depth of party patronage. At the 
same time, in this politicized context, incremental Weberian reforms – merit examinations 
and bureaucratic tenure protections – have occurred in the last two decades (Schuster, 
2014). Our survey design exploits the resulting variation in bureaucratic structures within 
state institutions. Since 2004, merit examinations for administrative personnel had been 
introduced for over 3,000 positions in the central government (roughly two percent of total 
                                                        
17 Where the DR stands globally in terms of work motivation remains, unfortunately, unclear, as global public 
sector work motivation data comprising the DR does, to our knowledge, not exist. 
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vacancies).18 A wide range of state institutions – 65 in total – recruited select personnel 
through merit examinations. The remaining vacancies were filled through political 
appointments. At the same time, a total of 33,395 public servants (seven percent of total 
employees) have been incorporated into an “administrative career” since 1995. While career 
paths for these employees remain undefined, a 2008 public service law and a 2010 
constitutional reform granted them tenure protection. 
While offering variation in merit and tenure, the DR’s context is biased against finding 
an effect of them. Enforcement of bureaucratic structures – in particular tenure protections 
– is partial, curtailing their effect on bureaucratic behavior. Governing parties appoint to 
audit institutions and the judiciary, thus controlling the key institutions safeguarding tenure 
enforcement. Hence, career servants face uncertainty about the extent to which their 
constitutional tenure rights will be protected. As a result, as detailed below, only just over 
half of them associate greater job stability with their tenure protections. Moreover, political 
patrons still have discretionary power over pay rises, promotions, and transfers, with which 
to incentivize the behavior of public servants, even when these are legally tenured and/or 
recruited based on merit. 
These contextual features of the DR case are, of course, not unique. Many countries with 
politicized bureaucracies also feature weak legal enforcement (Charron, Dahlström, & 
Lapuente, 2012). In this sense, the conclusions we draw from the DR case may plausibly 
travel to the range of countries with politicized bureaucracies. In a recent global expert 
survey, 64 percent of non-OECD countries fell into this category, with political criteria 
                                                        
18 Merit examinations were more prevalent for non-administrative personnel. Almost 24,000 teachers were 
recruited through merit examinations in 2006-2012, for instance (Schuster, 2016b). 
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trumping merit in public sector recruitment (Dahlberg, Dahlström, Sundin, & Teorell, 
2013).19 
Despite their ubiquity, though, public servants in hyper-politicized administrations 
such as the DR’s remain scarcely studied. This is, arguably, an important omission. 
Bureaucrats in hyper-politicized states can play important roles in tilting elections in favor 
of governments by campaigning for incumbents, channeling state resources to party 
supporters, depriving the public of resources for private enrichment and, at times, seeking 
to deliver quality public services despite politicization pressures (Gingerich, 2013b; 
Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Oliveros, 2016a, 2016b; Tendler, 1997; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014). 
Shedding new light on bureaucratic behavior in such contexts is thus an important empirical 
contribution of this paper in its own right. 
 
3.2 Survey Frame and Sample 
Our data come from an online survey of central government employees in the 
Dominican Republic administered through Qualtrics between November 2015 and January 
2016. The Ministry of Public Administration provided the survey frame for the convenience 
sample.20 The Ministry held a database of email addresses and observable characteristics – 
age, gender, institution, and seniority – of 2,416 administrative career public employees in 
                                                        
19  This is not to say that our findings may not have relevance for countries with more professionalized 
bureaucracies. Bureaucratic politicization at the top does occur in professionalized bureaucracies, and can 
shape bureaucratic outcomes (Gallo & Lewis, 2012). Whether our findings are generalizable to such contexts 
thus remains an important area for further empirical inquiry.  
20 In the Dominican central government, respondents would, ideally, be randomly sampled. The very nature of 
politicized states, however, precludes studying them with random samples: poor formal monitoring 
mechanisms implies politicized governments like the DR’s typically lack accurate lists of employees working 
for them (see, for instance, Dumas & Lafuente, 2015).  
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the central government. This database included all employees who, when registering as an 
administrative career servant with the Ministry of Public Administration, had provided an 
email address as part of their contact details. Of the 2,416 email addresses, 1,993 were 
working. All were sent an electronic invitation and three reminders to participate. 725 career 
servants started completing the online survey;  558 respondents – our sample – completed 
at least one conjoint experiment response. The response rate for our purposes was thus 
28%.21  
Respondents are representative of the general population of central government 
employees in terms of age and sex (Table A1 in Online Appendix (OA)), but, on average, more 
educated and more likely to be in professional ranks in the administrative hierarchy (Table 
A2 in OA). They came from 24 different state institutions (Table A3 in OA). 
 
3.3 Conjoint experiment 
Our experiment asked respondents to choose between profiles of two hypothetical 
public employees for a number of activities. We randomly vary the two employees’ profiles 
on six attributes: year of appointment, form of recruitment, administrative career (tenure), 
education, position, and gender (Table 1).22 The order of the attributes was randomized 
across respondents to rule out primacy effects, but was fixed across pairings for each 
respondent to reduce complexity (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015). 
 
                                                        
21 This number is slightly lower for conjoint questions 2-5. 
22  Two restrictions were imposed on the randomization to exclude combinations which would have been 
implausible to respondents: professional-level public employees with secondary education, either hired 
through examination and/or incorporated into the administrative career. 
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Table 1: Attributes and Attributes Values for Profiles in Conjoint Experiment 
 
Attributes Values 
Year of Appointment 2002 (Mejía Presidency) 
 2005 (Fernández Presidency) 
 2013 (Medina Presidency) 
Recruitment Public examination 
 Appointment 
Administrative Career Incorporated 
 In process of incorporation 
 Not incorporated 
Education High School 
 College Degree 
Position Administrative Support 
 Technical- Professional 
Sex Female 
 Male 
 
 
Each respondent evaluated, on separate screens, five pairs of randomly generated profiles.23 
Following a short introduction, we show respondents a screen with the profiles of two 
hypothetical employees as illustrated in Figure 1. In the instructions to respondents, these 
were presented as two “public employees from the central government.” The profile 
comparisons were followed by several questions – our dependent variables – which require 
respondents to choose between the two employees for different activities.24 The question 
order was randomized at the level of respondents to minimize priming effects.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
23 This enhances estimate precision without risking reliability: other studies point to no loss in reliability in 
forced choice conjoints with ten or fewer tasks (Hainmueller et al., 2015; Johnson & Orme, 1996). Our 
diagnostic check below confirms reliability across tasks for our own survey. 
24 The experiment included five questions. In this paper, we focus on three of those. 
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   Figure 1: Example Profile Comparison 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable questions measure corruption, political services, and work 
motivation. The first question is a proxy measure for Corruption: “Which of the two would 
you trust to administer the funds of a project transparently?” This is, of course, an indirect 
measure of corruption. A more direct question of corruption was precluded by the need for 
government authorization of the survey. While we acknowledge that the lack of 
transparency does not necessarily imply corruption, the lack of transparency is indeed a 
precondition for corruption. Since acts of corruption are harder to detect, lower levels of 
transparency in the public administration may lead to higher levels of corruption. This 
relationship between transparency and corruption has been asserted in a range of studies 
(see, e.g., Gerring & Thacker, 2004, pp. 316-317; Montinola & Jackman, 2002, p. 151), and 
has recently seen empirical support in several works (see, e.g., Kaufmann, Mastruzzi, & 
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Zavaleta, 2003; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010; Peisakhin, 2012).25 At the same time, our measure 
focuses not on transparency in general, but the transparent administration of project funds. 
Lack of transparency in fund management is a prerequisite for misusing funds. We may thus 
plausibly expect respondents to associate this question also with the misuse of funds. 
The second question is a measure for Political Services: “Which of the two would you 
find easier to convince to come to an electoral campaign event?” The question refers to the 
bureaucrats’ side of patron-client arrangements: the provision of political services or 
support to help politicians’ electoral fortunes. Here we focus on one of the most common of 
these political services among low and mid-level employees: participation in a campaign 
event.26  
Finally, the third question measures Work Motivation: “Which of the two would you 
find easier to motivate to work some extra hours to get a pending job done?” The phrasing 
of the question closely mirrors commonly used work motivation measures in the U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management’s (2016) Federal Viewpoint Survey27  and in Wright (2004)28 . 
Drawing on a single measure of work motivation, our study cannot offer insights into 
different dimensions of work motivation (cf. Wright, 2004). However, it does shed light on 
our core concern: public employees’ desire to work hard and work well in their jobs. 
                                                        
25 For an overview of the empirical literature of the relationship between corruption and transparency, see 
Rose-Ackerman (2004, p. 316-322). 
26 In the DR, 38 percent of public employees admit to working in electoral campaigns in population surveys, 
relative to 15 percent of respondents outside the public sector (Espinal, Morgan, & Seligson, 2012). In the DR’s 
hyper-presidentialist system, campaigning by public servants largely implicates campaigning for the governing 
party. To illustrate, during the 2008 elections, 13 out of 16 ministries were publicly incorporated into the PLD 
campaign command (Participación Ciudadana, 2008).  
27 ‘When needed I am willing to put in the extra effort to get a job done.’ 
28 ‘I am willing to start work early or stay late to finish a job.’ 
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In regards to our explanatory variables, we are, most of all, interested in the 
Recruitment and Administrative Career (Tenure Protection) attributes. Our Recruitment 
variable randomly takes on two values: examination or appointment. Administrative Career, 
in turn, takes on one of three values: “Incorporated”, “In process of incorporation”, and “Not 
incorporated”. Public servants incorporated into the administrative career enjoy tenure 
protections, while those not incorporated or in the process of incorporation do not. At the 
same time, public servants in the process of incorporation resemble career servants with 
tenure in observable and unobservable characteristics. They meet the formal (education and 
seniority) and informal (high-level political acquiescence) eligibility criteria for career entry 
(Schuster, 2014). Yet, the paperwork for career entry – and thus attainment of job stability – 
can take up to a year.29 
Finally, we also randomly vary other attributes that previous studies identify as 
potentially influential for our outcomes of interest: year of appointment, education, position, 
and sex. For instance, previous studies have shown that women tend to be generally less 
involved in corruption than men and less likely to tolerate corruption (Swamy, Knack, Lee, 
& Azfar, 2001; Torgler & Valev, 2010); and, at least in one study, more willing to provide 
favors to voters (Oliveros, 2016a). Similarly, the year of appointment might have an effect on 
our outcomes. In a politicized state like the DR, the recruiting Presidency might be perceived 
as a proxy for the political sympathies of the employee. For instance, employees ideologically 
closer to the party in power (appointed by the current administration) might be more willing 
to provide political services to the politician that had hired them (Oliveros, 2016b). Finally, 
                                                        
29 As a result, we can isolate the effect of job stability from confounding associations respondents may have 
about unique characteristics of administrative career servants by comparing public servants incorporated into 
the career with those in the process of incorporation (cf. Dafoe, Zhang, & Caughey, 2015). 
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more educated employees might be expected to behave differently from less educated 
colleagues since they enjoy better labor market opportunities in the private sector (Calvo & 
Murillo, 2004). 
 
4. Results 
 
What effects do Weberian state structures have on bureaucratic behavior in the Dominican 
Republic? To find out, we estimated linear probability models relating our dependent 
variables to varying values of our six attributes: recruitment, administrative career (tenure), 
position, education, gender, and year of appointment.30 As respondents were presented with 
five successive profile comparisons, standard errors were clustered by respondent (see 
Hainmueller et al., 2014 for further detail on the empirical analysis of conjoint 
experiments).31 
Figures 2 to 4 plot the results for our outcome variables: corruption, political services, 
and work motivation.32  Point estimates for each attribute value represent their average 
marginal component effect (AMCE) over baseline values, along with 95 percent confidence 
intervals. To illustrate with an example, an AMCE is the difference in probability that a 
respondent would find a public servant recruited via examination easier to convince to work 
hard relative to an otherwise identical public servant recruited via appointment.  
                                                        
30  Estimates were calculated using the ‘cjoint’ package in R (Strezhnev, Berwick, Hainmueller, Hopkins, & 
Yamamoto, 2016). 
31 Our experimental design is robust to the range of diagnostic checks laid out in Hainmueller et al. (2014). We 
find neither significant profile order, attribute order or carryover effects for merit and tenure. We estimate 
these by testing whether the number of significant differences between all possible pairwise comparisons of 
estimates for recruitment and job stability between left-right profiles, top-to-bottom-attributes and first-to-
last task are larger than those resulting from a random draw. We find no statistically significant profile order 
effects (at the 5% level) for recruitment and job stability for each of our three dependent variables. For attribute 
order and task order (carryover), the number of significant differences between pairwise comparisons of 
estimates is not significantly larger than the number which would be expected to result from a random draw.  
32 The full regression models for these figures are displayed in Tables B.1-B.3 in the Online Appendix. 
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For our first dimension of bureaucratic behavior, corruption, bureaucratic structures 
make a difference – albeit in a heterogeneous manner (Figure 2). In line with our theoretical 
expectation (H1), respondents are significantly more trusting of employees recruited 
through examination when it comes to non-corrupt management of funds (+10%). At first 
sight, the same appears to hold for employees with job stability (H2): public servants in the 
administrative career (with tenure) are significantly more likely (+16%) to be trusted with 
the non-corrupt management of funds than those not incorporated. Note, however, that 
respondents may associate characteristics other than job stability with public servants 
incorporated into the career – such as greater skill or closer relationships with supervisors. 
As a robustness check which addresses the resulting confounding concern (Dafoe et al., 
2015), we thus also compare public servants inside the career with those in the process of 
career incorporation (with similar unobservable characteristics, but no tenure). In the case 
of corruption, the estimate for administrative career servants (+16%) is significantly larger 
than that of public servants who are in the process of incorporation (+5%). Job stability thus 
appears to reduce perceived corruption. As detailed below, however, this result is not robust. 
Estimates for the other attributes predict sensible differences. Respondents place 
greater trust in public servants to manage project funds in a transparent manner when they 
are more educated, female, and at the technical-professional level. This is consistent with 
prior studies on gender and corruption (Frank, Lambsdorff, & Boehm, 2011; Swamy et al., 
2001; Torgler & Valev, 2010), and several studies of education and corruption (e.g. Botero, 
Ponce, & Shleifer, 2013;  but see Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). In addition, employees 
recruited by the incumbent party Presidents (Fernández and Medina) – rather than by the 
opposition – are also perceived to be less corrupt. This may appear to run counter to 
 24 
responsiveness arguments: public servants recruited by the governing party may be more 
inclined to engage in “stealing for the team” (Gingerich, 2013b). In the Dominican context, 
however, our findings are highly plausible since the Mejía administration (2000-04) was 
recognized as one of the most corrupt in recent Dominican history (Singer, 2012).33 
 
Figure 2. (Lack of) Corruption  
 
Note: Bars around point estimates represent 95% confidence intervals.                                                                
Attributes without point estimates represent baseline attribute values (0). 
 
 
                                                        
33 Consistent with this evidence, respondents recruited by both the incumbent party and the opposition party 
under Mejía associate incumbent party recruits with lower corruption (as well as greater work motivation and 
political service provision) (see Figures 4.a to 4.c in OA).   
 25 
For our second dimension of bureaucratic behavior – political services – the effects of 
bureaucratic structures confirm our theoretical expectations (Figure 3). Respondents are 
significantly less likely to find public servants recruited via examination easier to convince 
to attend an electoral campaign event (-12%) (H3). Vice versa, this suggests that appointees 
are found significantly easier to mobilize for electoral campaigns. This effect of examinations 
on political services is, substantively, almost twice as large as the effect on work motivation 
discussed further below. Similarly, job stability exerts a significant (and negative) perceived 
effect on political services (H4). Estimates for public servants in the administrative career (-
8%), yet not for those in the process of career incorporation (-3%, p=0.14) are significant.34 
Respondents thus find public servants with job stability harder to mobilize for electoral 
campaign events. A second identification strategy in the ‘robustness checks’ section below 
confirms this finding. 
The other characteristics, once again, predict sensible differences. Our respondents are 
significantly more likely to find public employees easier to convince to attend electoral 
campaign events when they are recruited by the incumbent party Presidents, less educated, 
and at lower hierarchical ranks. 35  This is consistent with the handful of studies on 
bureaucratic behavior in politicized states: educated and professional employees with better 
private labor market alternatives (Calvo & Murillo, 2004), and employees not hired by the 
incumbent party may face fewer incentives to participate in electoral mobilization (Oliveros, 
2016b).  
                                                        
34 The estimate for public servants in the process of career incorporation is significantly smaller than that of 
career public servants at the 10% level (p=0.099). 
35 The effect of technical-professional positions is not statistically significant, however (p=0.11). 
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Respondents also find it harder to mobilize female colleagues to campaign. To-date, 
there is virtually no research on the role of gender in bureaucratic clientelism (but see 
Oliveros, 2016a). This is surprising not least in view of the significant body of research on 
gender and corruption (Swamy et. al, 2001; Torgler & Valev, 2010). In fact, to our knowledge, 
our study is the first to link female bureaucrats with a significant negative effect on political 
service provision to incumbents.36  
 
Figure 3. Political Services  
 
 
                                                        
36 Note that this effect does not stem from female respondents preferring their own group of fellow female 
public servants. Both male and female respondents find women to be less willing to provide political services 
and less corrupt (see Figures 5.a and 5.b in OA). 
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Finally, when it comes to our third outcome variable – work motivation – the effects of 
Weberian state structures are remarkably heterogeneous (Figure 4). Public employees 
recruited via examination are significantly more likely (+7%) to be found easier to motivate 
to work hard relative to those recruited by appointment (H5’). By contrast, job stability does 
not have a robust effect on work motivation (H6). Public servants in the administrative 
career (with tenure) are significantly more likely (+6%) to be found easier to motivate to 
work hard than those not incorporated. Yet, the point estimate on work motivation is even 
larger for those in the process of career incorporation (with similar unobservable 
characteristics to career servants, but no tenure) (+7%). This suggests that unobservable 
characteristics of tenured public servants – rather than their tenure – account for the effect 
on work motivation.  
Concurrently, the (unsurprising) findings for other characteristics increase confidence 
in the validity of our results. Respondents are significantly more likely to find fellow public 
servants recruited by the incumbent party, with university education, and positioned at the 
technical-professional level as easier to motivate to work hard – relative to high school 
graduates, opposition party hires, and administrative support-level staff (Figure 4). Gender, 
by contrast, made no significant difference.  
In sum, our results suggest that examinations and tenure are associated with lower 
corruption (H1 & H2) and political services (H3 & H4). Examinations, additionally, enhance 
work motivation (H5’), while tenure does not seem to affect work motivation (H6) Except 
for the effect of tenure on corruption (H2), these results remain robust throughout a range 
of checks. 
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Figure 4. Work Motivation  
 
 
 
 
6. Robustness Checks 
As noted, our sample is representative of public servants in the Dominican Republic in only 
some respects (gender and age), yet not others. Our respondents have, on average, relative 
to Dominican public servants, more experience in the public sector, are more educated, and 
are more likely to hold a technical-professional rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy (Table A.2 
in OA). Moreover, many of our respondents are drawn from a single institution (the General 
Audit Office). Our results could thus merely reflect the perceptions of a group of officials with 
very specific opinions about the behavior of their fellow bureaucrats.  
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To address this concern, we re-estimated our treatment effects for merit examinations 
and tenure across a series of subgroups in our sample: gender, education, hierarchy, age, 
years of service, and institution. This yielded 36 subgroup comparisons in total (see Online 
Appendix C). In 35 of these subgroup comparisons, our core results for merit and tenure 
remain robust.37 Underrepresented subgroups – such as administrative assistants or public 
servants with fewer years of work experience – do not provide significantly different 
estimates from the remaining subgroups, neither are results sensitive to the exclusion of the 
General Audit Office. Although we cannot completely rule out the possibility that a 
representative survey would have generated different results, our subgroup analyses do not 
provide any reason to suspect that our results would not hold with a broader sample of 
Dominican public servants. 
At the same time, these responses, of course, need not necessarily be unbiased. Our 
respondents might wish to shed favorable light on the government (and its administrative 
reform program); might respond based on effects that they believe merit and tenure should 
have on bureaucratic behavior; or might tend to see their own group of career servants more 
favorably. To test for these biases, we conducted several subgroup analyses. With the 
exception of the effect of tenure on corruption outlined below, our findings remain robust. 
To address the first potential bias – respondents strategically favoring or holding 
more positive views about the government and its reform program – we assess whether the 
effects of merit and tenure depend on respondent ideological proximity to the government. 
                                                        
37  For our core assertions about the effects of merit and tenure, we either find no statistically significant 
differences in ATEs between subgroups, or statistically significant differences in which our core results remain 
significant for each subgroup. A single subgroup comparison – the effect of merit examinations on work 
motivation in the case of high school-educated respondents – is the exception: it is significantly smaller than 
for university-educated respondents and overall insignificant. Due to the small number of high school 
respondents (N=15), however, we cannot rule out that this is merely a statistical artifact. 
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If respondents close to the government had a more positive impression of government 
programs, they would report more favorable effects of merit and tenure. We measure 
proximity to government with ideological alignment: whether respondents place themselves 
and the country’s President identically on the same 0-10 left right ideological scale (Figure 1 
in OA; 39 percent of respondents are ideologically aligned).38 For the effects of examinations 
on corruption and political services, we do not find statistically significant differences in 
preferences between ideologically aligned and non-aligned respondents (Figures 2.a and 2.b 
in OA). For the effect of examinations on work motivation, however, there is a statistically 
significant difference (p=0.01) (Figure 2.c in OA). For respondents aligned with the 
government, the positive effect of examinations on work motivation is much smaller (+2% 
relative to +11%) and insignificant. This speaks against rather than for biases in favor of 
governmental programs, however. Moreover, it suggests that respondents evaluate the 
characteristics of profiled public servants relative to their own situation: those aligned with 
the party in power find (political) appointees easier to motivate.39 
For the administrative career, by contrast, we can only rule out such biases for work 
motivation and political services, albeit not corruption. While there are no significant 
differences for estimates on work motivation and political services, ideologically aligned 
respondents provide significantly more favorable estimates for career servants when it 
comes to lower corruption (+21% vs. +13%, p=0.04). We may thus not rule out that (part of) 
the relationship between job stability and corruption is spurious: respondents closer to 
                                                        
38 We use a measure of ideological distance rather than partisanship, as it appeared less likely to be prone to 
social desirability biases and to alienate our respondents. Substantively, we know that individuals who place 
themselves ideologically close to a party are more likely to identify themselves with that party (Lupu, 2015). 
39 Alternatively, respondents closer to the government may place greater trust in government authorities to 
appoint public servants (without examinations) motivated to work hard.  
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government may have a favorable impression of the government’s administrative career 
reform program and therefore associate it with lower corruption.  
A second potential bias is somewhat subtler: respondents might respond based on 
prior learning about the effects that merit and tenure should have, given bureaucratic reform 
goals – rather than workplace experiences. Two pieces of evidence suggest this is not the 
case. First, respondents do not consistently associate bureaucratic structures with their 
purported reform goals. For instance, they associate career employees with lower political 
services, yet not robustly more work motivation (see Figure 2). Second, if estimates were 
based on learning about reform goals rather than day-to-day experiences with colleagues, 
estimates should become larger as time passes, with respondents becoming more familiar 
with official reform goals. Yet, we do not observe this in the data.40  
Third, our results might be biased due to halo effects: respondents may have more 
favorable impressions of colleagues who share their characteristics. Yet, we find no evidence 
of halo effects in a range of cases: male vs. female, governing vs. opposition party recruits, 
and high school vs. university graduates (see OA). Moreover, administrative career 
respondents do not consistently favor hypothetical colleagues in the administrative career 
over those in the process of incorporation (see, e.g., Figure 2); and administrative career 
employees with more experience in the administrative career – who may have come to 
identify with it more strongly – do not provide more favorable estimates of career employees 
(Figures 11.a-11.c in OA). 
                                                        
40 Considering only responses from governing party recruits (to isolate the effect of years of experience from party 
orientation), we find no differences in the estimates of merit and tenure between respondents with more and less than 
ten years of experience (the median value of work experience of governing party recruits) (see Figures 11.a -11.c in 
OA). 
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Lastly and perhaps most importantly, we compare a further subset of respondents: 
those who associate the administrative career with greater job stability and those who do 
not. Respondents were virtually equally split (51% vs. 49%) in this regard (Figure 3 in 
OA). 41 , 42  This is unsurprising: while career servants count on constitutional tenure 
protections, weak rule of law jeopardizes the value of these protections. We estimate the 
difference that job stability makes by comparing the estimates of the administrative career 
between respondents who associate it with enhanced job stability and those who do not. We 
find no significant differences between these estimates for work motivation and corruption 
(Figures 3.b. and 3.c in OA). In other words, the perceived effects of the administrative career 
on work motivation and corruption are not significantly different between respondents who 
associate the career with greater job stability and those who do not. Job stability by itself 
thus does not seem to make a significant difference for work motivation or corruption. This 
confirms the full sample (insignificant) effect for work motivation. At the same time, it 
suggests that the effect of tenure on corruption identified in Figure 2 is not robust.  By 
contrast, for political services, there is a statistically significant difference (at the 10% level, 
p=0.08). Respondents who associate the administrative career with greater job stability find 
it significantly harder to convince hypothetical administrative career servants to go out and 
campaign (-11%, p<0.01) (Figure 3.a in OA). Yet, respondents who do not associate the 
career with enhanced job stability do not find it statistically significantly harder to convince 
                                                        
41 We measured this by asking separately whether – and how strongly – respondents agree or disagree with 
the notion that public servants and administrative career servants are protected from arbitrary dismissals. The 
order of these two questions was randomized so as to avoid priming respondents. 
42 Note that responses in this robustness check are uncorrelated (r=-0.03) with the ideological alignment of 
respondents. Respondents thus do not seem to associate the career with enhanced job stability merely to 
provide a more favorable impression of a governmental reform; else, respondents closer to government should 
provide more favorable estimates.  
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colleagues to campaign. This suggests that job stability, in fact, curbs public servants’ 
willingness to campaign.  
 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Bureaucratic behavior in developing countries affects development centrally, yet remains 
poorly understood. Why do some public servants – yet not others – work hard to deliver 
public services, misuse state resources, and/or campaign for governing parties? This paper 
looks at two key Weberian bureaucratic structures – merit and tenure – to explain these 
conundrums. Weber (1978) had argued that merit recruitment and job stability, among 
other bureaucratic structures, create an esprit de corps around political neutrality, integrity, 
and commitment to public service. Our paper finds that Weber was right, but only in part. In 
our conjoint experiment merit examinations are indeed associated with greater political 
neutrality (fewer political services), greater work motivation, and greater integrity (lower 
corruption). By contrast, job stability only delivers on one of Weber’s promises: a more 
politically neutral public service, less willing to help parties with electoral efforts. 43 
 Our findings thus provide important nuance to Weber’s predictions. While merit 
examinations enhance the quality of bureaucracy (motivation and lower corruption) and 
democracy (electoral competition), job stability only enhances the quality of democracy. 
Focused on single outcome variables, prior studies had overlooked this nuance. This finding 
also underscores the gains from assessing the effects of bureaucratic structures on the 
political and administrative behavior of public servants concurrently.  
                                                        
43  In fairness to Weber, Weber theorized about the joint effects of merit, tenure, and other bureaucratic 
structures, while we are assessing the more disaggregated, marginal effects of merit and tenure. 
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Importantly, we draw these inferences from the, to our knowledge, first survey 
experimental test of bureaucratic structures. Prior studies had correlated bureaucratic 
structures with outcomes such as lower corruption and more political neutrality. However, 
in light of omitted variable and reverse causality concerns, it remains unclear to what extent 
those correlations can be interpreted as causal effects. Relying on a conjoint experiment – a 
method which had previously not been used to study bureaucracy – our study can address 
these limitations and isolate the effects of bureaucratic structures more robustly.  
For the many civil service reform attempts in developing countries (cf. World Bank, 
2008), our findings are good news. Changing bureaucratic structures can positively affect 
bureaucratic behavior in politicized states. Merit trumps tenure in terms of its favorable 
behavioral effects, enhancing not only the fairness of electoral competition as tenure does, 
but also bureaucratic performance and integrity. Nonetheless, both merit and tenure remain 
desirable reforms for developing country bureaucracies. Civil service reformers in 
developing countries should thus take Weber to heart. 
Beyond shedding light on the effects of Weberian bureaucratic structures, our findings 
have important implications for other scholarly debates. In particular, our paper is the first 
to show that employees who are appointed – rather than recruited via examinations – are 
perceived to be more willing to provide political services. We thus provide a micro-
foundation for studies linking patronage states to incumbency advantages (e.g. Folke et al., 
2011). Our paper also provides micro-foundations for studies correlating Weberian state 
structures with positive development outcomes. Public employees recruited through 
examinations are more hard working and less corrupt and, as a result, arguably more able to 
regulate businesses well (cf. Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016); pursue economic growth-
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enhancing policies (cf. Evans & Rauch, 1999); and deliver higher quality services which 
reduce corruption and improve health outcomes (cf. Cingolani et al., 2015; Henderson et al., 
2007). 
This paper also underscores the relevance of demographic characteristics in explaining 
bureaucratic behavior. Most notably, our study is the first to show that female public 
servants may not only curb corruption, but also political service provision. This suggests that 
the recruitment of women into public service in politicized states may have a benefit beyond 
lower corruption: it may reduce the use of bureaucrats for electoral mobilization. More 
generally, this finding points to potential gains from expanding the study of gender and good 
government. A panoply of prior studies has assessed the relationship between gender and 
corruption. We show that the behavioral effects of gender extend beyond corruption to other 
good government dimensions such as (lack of) clientelism. 
These contributions notwithstanding, our study is, of course, not without limitations. 
First, our design is unable to disentangle whether merit and tenure shape bureaucratic 
behavior by changing the types of bureaucrats that join the public sector or by changing the 
on-the-job behavior of bureaucrats. Both are likely to be at play. Prior studies have 
associated other bureaucratic reforms – higher salaries (Dal Bó, Finan, & Rossi, 2013; 
Krueger, 1988) and more attractive career opportunities (Ashraf, Bandiera, & Lee, 2014) – 
with higher quality applicants. By changing working conditions and, in the case of merit 
examinations, employee selection methods, tenure and merit are likely to similarly shape 
who joins the public administration. By facilitating socialization into a public sector ethos 
and changing on-the-job incentives, merit and tenure may, however, equally be expected to 
change the behavior of existing employees. 
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Second, our study draws inferences from perceptions of public servants, not their 
actual behavior. While our respondents interact with colleagues with the characteristics we 
are studying on a daily basis – and are thus well-placed to provide valid estimates – it 
remains for future research to determine whether our findings hold with behavioral 
measures. Not less importantly, our inferences were drawn from studying a single politicized 
central government. Our ‘less likely’ case selection procedure gives us some confidence that 
our findings from the DR might be generalizable to other politicized states. However, 
whether our findings do in fact travel to other politicized states or beyond that to more 
professional bureaucracies remains an empirical question. Future research would thus do 
well to assess the effect of bureaucratic structures on bureaucratic behavior elsewhere. Our 
study suggests that the conjoint analysis we applied to the study of public administration in 
this paper can be a powerful method for this purpose – and for the study of bureaucracy at-
large.  
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